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The Congruence Principle Applied:
Rethinking Equal Protection
Review of Federal Alienage
Classifications After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peria
F ounded on the ideal of equality under the law for all people,
the United States has long prided itself as a nation of immi-
grants. From the welcoming words of Lady Liberty1 to the meta-
phor of the "melting pot,"2 America's history is replete with
images of an inclusive society dedicated to the proposition that
all parties to its social contract are free and equal citizens. In-
deed, the Fourteenth Amendment specifically guarantees that all
persons are entitled to equal treatment under the law.3
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their invitation to participate in this Symposium; Michelle Ryan and Andrea Myers
for their excellent research assistance; and finally, my wife, Corie, and my family in
the Philippines for their constant love and support.
I The inscription on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty reads:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.
Hodge v. United States Dep't of Justice, 929 F.2d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting) (citing poem by Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in AMERICA FOR-
EVER Now (1968)).
2 Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 311 (1986) (discussing the origins of the "melting pot" concept in
U.S. history).
3 "Nor shall any State ... deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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However, just as vivid in this nation's history are the many
manifestations of xenophobia, racism, and outright hatred visited
upon noncitizens4 through the centuries. While there have been
periods of unrestricted entry into the United States, there appear
to have been just as many years of virtual border closure, often
accompanied by strong anti-immigrant sentiment.5
The United States Congress is charged with the unenviable
task of creating a coherent immigration policy in the shadow of
the nation's historical mood swings vis-A-vis noncitizens.6 Hand
in hand with its power over foreign relations, Congress has long
enjoyed "plenary power" over immigration policy; this power
stems from the belief that a sovereign nation should have broad
discretion in determining who it admits to and excludes from its
polity.7 Invoking the plenary power doctrine, the United States
4 I use the term "noncitizen" or "immigrant" in place of "alien," and "undocu-
mented immigrant" in place of "illegal alien." While I recognize that the term
'alien" is one of art that has a legal meaning under the Immigration Code, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3), I believe that referring to noncitizens as "aliens" is pejorative and calls
attention to their perceived "foreignness." See Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection
Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 573, 573 n.4 (1997) [hereinafter "Romero, HTA "]; Victor C. Romero, Note,
Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights
After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 999, 999 n.1 (1992); see also Roy L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (1995) (observing that "illegal alien" is pejorative
and tends to dehumanize the undocumented); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Out-
laws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection
Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1995) (stating that referring to noncitizens
as "aliens" "calls attention to their 'otherness,' and even associates them with non-
human invaders from outer space"). I must attest to some sensitivity on my part
having been an "alien" myself until 1995. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory In-
terpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 n.4 (1990) (noting a feeling of "hypersensitivity"
to the term "alien," as author was once one himself). Nonetheless, I do not advo-
cate "political correctness" for its own sake, but because I believe that the terms I
have chosen are preferable substitutes which are consistent with the idea of equality
for all. Finally, I favor the term "alienage classification" rather than "citizenship
classification" because the former captures the dehumanizing nature of such catego-
rizations and supports the thesis that such classifications should generally be strictly
scrutinized, whether enacted by Congress or the states. See infra Part lI.B.
5 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing history of anti-immigrant sentiment in the
United States and the intersection of race and alienage).
6 The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to create a "uniform Rule
of Naturalization." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
7 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1984) ("Immigration law often implicates the nation's basic foreign policy
objectives, a circumstance that has sometimes provoked the Supreme Court, even in
nonimmigration contexts, to be less scrupulous in safeguarding constitutional values
and more deferential to the other branches of government."); see also infra Part I.
[Vol. 76, 19971
The Congruence Principle Applied
Supreme Court has consistently held that any congressional ac-
tion that unduly burdens noncitizens, be it in the narrower con-
text of immigration law (concerning the admission to and
exclusion from the United States) or in alienage law more
broadly (encompassing the law of immigrants' rights generally),8
should be accorded the greatest deference and should be upheld
against equal protection challenge so long as Congress is able to
articulate a rational basis for the law.9
Conversely, the Court has determined that any state statute
that discriminates against noncitizens must survive strict scrutiny.
The Court has reasoned that because states do not enjoy plenary
sovereign power over national immigration, any state laws bur-
dening noncitizens' rights must be justified by a compelling state
interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. 10
The only exception to this broad rule is that a state may reserve
key occupations of a sufficiently political nature to its citizens as
long as the classification survives rational basis scrutiny.1
Thus, under prevailing equal protection law developed in the
shadow of over a century's adherence to the plenary power doc-
trine, Congress may largely burden noncitizens' rights with impu-
nity, while states may not. Many legal scholars have called for a
8 1 use the term "immigration law" as Professor Motomura has, referring to "the
body of law governing the admission and expulsion of [noncitizens]. It should be
distinguished from the more general law of [noncitizens'] rights and obligations,
which includes, for example, their tax status, military obligations, and eligibility for
government benefits and certain types of employment." Motomura, supra note 4, at
547. Like Professor Michael Scaperlanda, I use the term "alienage law" to describe
the more general area of immigrants' rights law. See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 713
(1996). Another convention is to use the terms "inside" and "outside" immigration
law. Thus, "inside" immigration law is synonymous with "immigration law," and
"outside" immigration law refers to the general law of immigrants' rights. See also
Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1994) (criticizing the conventional distinction the
cases make between "inside" and "outside" immigration law).
9 See infra Part I.
10 See infra Part I.
11 Under the "political function" doctrine, a state may exclude noncitizens from
occupying certain state government jobs to the extent that such positions "go to the
heart of representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973). See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (holding that New York
could bar employment of noncitizens as state troopers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (holding that New York may refuse to employ as primary and secon-
dary school teachers noncitizens who are eligible for citizenship but who refuse to
seek naturalization); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (sustaining Cali-
fornia requirement that all "peace officers" be citizens).
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revision of this dual standard of review, contending that there is
no sound reason to continue with the legal fiction of the plenary
power doctrine and to grant substantial deference to Congress on
matters of immigration, specifically, and immigrants' rights,
generally.
12
This Article takes a slightly different approach to this argu-
ment. It suggests that the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peia13 constitutes a starting point
12 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Consti-
tution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 870 (1983) (suggesting that rather than invoking Con-
gress's plenary power, "courts ought to examine the justifications offered on behalf
of federal regulations based on alienage to see if they meet traditional constitutional
standards of permissibility," and should also more strictly review regulations bur-
dening fundamental constitutional rights); Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Ar-
rogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 591, 603 & n.52 (1994) (arguing that the Court has failed to articulate a viable
reason for why state and federal laws would be subject to different levels of scru-
tiny); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Ap-
praisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1062 (1979) (arguing that a classification cannot be
suspect when the states employ it, yet not suspect when invoked by the federal gov-
ernment); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal
Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1089 (1979) (same); Stephen H. Legomsky, Im-
migration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT.
REV. 255, 303, 305 (foretelling the demise of the plenary power doctrine); Gerald M.
Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 316-36 (arguing that constitutional limits on
classification by alienage should apply to federal as well as state government).
Historically, the plenary power doctrine involved congressional power only over
foreign relations and immigration law-not immigrants' rights law generally. Thus,
there was no judicial review of congressional action challenged through an equal
protection claim. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). How-
ever, the Court has invoked the plenary power doctrine in immigrants' rights cases,
tempering the doctrine somewhat by requiring Congress to establish a rational basis
for any law that unduly burdens noncitizens' equal protection rights. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 (1976). See infra Part I.B.2.
13 515 U.S. 200 (1995). My use of the Adarand decision in this Article and in my
prior work does not imply that I agree with the Court's opinion in that case. At the
simplest level, the replacement of Justice Marshall with Justice Thomas led to the
Metro Broadcasting dissenters' acquisition of the crucial fifth vote for the proposi-
tion that government programs should be color-blind, blurring the distinction be-
tween benign and invidious race-based classifications. Compare Adarand, 515 U.S.
200, with Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). See also Paul J.
Mishkin, Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point: Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 875, 879 (1996) (attributing Court's change of heart to change in its composi-
tion). At another level, I disagree with the Adarand majority's assertion that it is
difficult to discern whether a governmental program serves a meritorious or discrim-
inatory purpose. However, I do not weigh in on this debate in this Article. Indeed,
my motives are more Machiavellian: I intend to take what I perceive to be an incor-
rect decision and extract from it a useful principle that could help yield salutary
results in a different context. I intend to show that Justice O'Connor's congruence
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for a renewed dialogue on the intersection of race, noncitizens'
rights, and immigration law. In Adarand, the Court held that
race-based classifications by the federal government should be
subject to the same level of scrutiny as those enacted by the
states-a principle Justice O'Connor describes as "congru-
ence."14 This Article contends that the principle of congruence
should be applied to alienage classifications so that federal alien-
age classifications are scrutinized in the same manner as state
alienage classifications.15 Specifically, courts should strictly scru-
tinize all federal alienage classifications that affect immigrants'
rights in the alienage law context. In addition, courts should
strictly scrutinize such classifications within immigration law that
impair fundamental rights. However, courts should defer to con-
gressional classifications within immigration law that do not im-
pinge upon fundamental rights.
This modified Adarand model is superior to the current equal
protection approach in at least three ways. First, the principle of
congruence ensures that noncitizens' rights are protected when
burdened by either the state or the federal government. Second,
this modified approach balances Congress's constitutional man-
date to create a viable immigration policy with the right of nonci-
tizens to be treated equitably. And third, this model places the
issue of immigrants' rights in its proper context by acknowledg-
ing the nation's historical and, indeed, current16 bias against im-
principle is a helpful device for overcoming the extreme deference shown Congress
in the area of immigrants' rights. See infra Part II.B. Because of my chosen ap-
proach, I believe it unnecessary here to closely review Adarand and its predecessors
or to scrutinize Justice O'Connor's two other principles.
14 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
15 1 first explored the idea of using Adarand as a springboard for this model in an
earlier article. See Romero, HTA, supra note 4, at 599-600. However, that article
examined the use of the congruence principle in a much narrower context, specifi-
cally as a method for criticizing current federal court analysis of the alienage classifi-
cation in the federal Hostage Taking Act. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1984) (text
of the Hostage Taking Act).
16 This anti-immigrant mood is reflected in much of journalist Peter Brimelow's
relatively recent book on immigration. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COM-
MON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995). Professor Kevin
Johnson interprets Brimelow's attacks on affirmative action, multiculturalism, and
bilingual education as placing blame on "immigrants for the dismal state of race-
relations in the United States." Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race,
Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 112 (1996). See also
Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927 (1996) (reviewing ALIEN NATION); Peter H. Schuck,
Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963 (1996) (reviewing ALIEN NATION).
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migrants, especially nonwhite immigrants.
Part I of this Article examines the historical foundations of the
plenary power doctrine up to the current dichotomy between ju-
dicial review of state and federal alienage classifications under
equal protection. Part II reviews the Adarand decision, arguing
that Justice O'Connor's congruence principle provides the bul-
wark for a revision of judicial review of federal legislation, espe-
cially in light of the historical and continuing perception of
Asian- and Latino-Americans as noncitizens. The Article briefly
concludes that underlying the proposed model is the well-estab-
lished tenet that the equal protection guarantee stands as the
vanguard of minority rights against systematic government
discrimination.
I
THE CURRENT MODEL: EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE
ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS
A. The History of the Federal Plenary Power Doctrine
The plenary power doctrine emerged from the fiction of na-
tional sovereignty.17  In The Chinese Exclusion Case i  the
Supreme Court held that Congress had absolute power to ex-
clude Chinese nationals from reentry into the United States on
the basis of a perceived economic and social threat from the
growing numbers of "unassimilable" Chinese who immigrated to
California seeking their fortunes in the gold rush of the late nine-
teenth century. 19 In upholding the exclusion law, the Court es-
tablished the federal government's unfettered power to bar
noncitizens from the United States as an incident of the nation's
sovereign jurisdiction, free from judicial review:
That the government of the United States, through the action
17 See, e.g., Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses
Of Legal Fiction In Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 51 (1989) (describing
the concept of sovereignty and plenary power in immigration law as legal fictions).
18 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
19 Professor Motomura notes that the Supreme Court's candidly racist and nativist
decision may not be so surprising when viewed in its historical context: "We must
bear in mind that this was an earlier era of constitutional law, when equal protection
was well on its way to 'separate but equal,' and judicial recognition of the substan-
tive and procedural rights of individuals was still far beyond the constitutional hori-
zon." Motomura, supra note 4, at 551. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (approving the "separate but equal" doctrine).
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of the legislative department, can exclude [noncitizens] from
its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation.2 . . . If it could not
exclude [noncitizens] it would be to that extent subject to the
control of another power .... If there be any just ground of
complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the polit-
ical department of our government, which is alone competent
to act upon the subject.
Interestingly, while the Court described Congress's exclusionary
power as "part of those sovereign powers delegated by the con-
stitution, '22 the text of the Constitution does not explicitly confer
this power, limiting the federal government's reach to establish-
ing a "uniform Rule of Naturalization. '23  Nonetheless, Con-
gress's plenary power over immigration was born.2 n
Since it was first introduced in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
the plenary power doctrine has been surprisingly resilient.25 De-
spite the inherent tension in embracing an American judicial
concept that holds the rights of the sovereign consistently supe-
rior to those of the individual, albeit a noncitizen,26 the Court has
often invoked Congress's plenary power, inevitably resulting in
the sacrifice of immigrants' rights in favor of the exercise of unre-
strained sovereign power by the federal government.
27
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Legomsky, supra note 12, at 274;
Motomura, supra note 4, at 551; Wani, supra note 17, at 67.
21 The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. at 603-
04, 609 (citations added).
22 Id. at 609.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24 Professor Gabriel Chin notes that, ironically, The Chinese Exclusion Case and
its progeny would likely be decided differently today because of the modern Court's
belief in the unconstitutionality of race-based discrimination. Gabriel J. Chin, Seg-
regation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Im-
migration 84-88 (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also Michael
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965, 976-77
("The Court [in The Chinese Exclusion Case] did not address the question of
whether exclusion of chinese nationals on racial grounds violated the
Constitution.").
25 See Schuck, supra note 7, at 3 ("Classical immigration law proved to be re-
markably durable.").
26 Id. (discussing the inherent tension between liberalism and restrictive
nationalism).
27 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (hold-
ing that decision to subject 25-year resident noncitizen to entry rules rather than
deportation rules is subject to deference under plenary power doctrine); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that power to
exclude German wife of U.S. national is fundamental to sovereignty); The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding that noncitizens inside U.S. may invoke
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Despite the durability of the plenary power doctrine, the Court
has occasionally endorsed greater protection for immigrants'
rights within both immigration law specifically and alienage law,
more generally. First, within immigration law, the Court has
noted that, in spite of the doctrine, noncitizens are entitled to
greater procedural due process rights when the government
seeks to deport them than when they initially seek entry into the
country. 8 Second, within alienage law, the Court has held that
noncitizens are entitled to several constitutional protections be-
yond procedural due process. 29 Indeed, immigrants' rights are
closely guarded when a state attempts to discriminate against
noncitizens.3 ° Thus, the Court has felt compelled to draw back
from the absolute deference accorded Congress by the plenary
greater constitutional protection than those seeking admission); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (invoking plenary power doctrine to uphold de-
portation of resident noncitizens and concluding that no distinction exists between
deportation and exclusion in terms of constitutional safeguards); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (upholding administrative officer's exclusion of
resident noncitizen based on plenary power doctrine). Time and again, the Court
has emphasized that Congress's immigration power is incident to its sovereignty and
inextricably intertwined with its power over foreign relations. See, e.g., Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("Our cases have long recognized the power to expel
or exclude [noncitizens] as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Gov-
ernment's political departments largely immune from judicial control."); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89
(1952) ("[A]ny policy toward [noncitizens] is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government."); Hines v. David-
owitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) ("Consequently the regulation of [noncitizens] is so
intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government
that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, 'the act of Congress, or
the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it."') (citation omitted); Oceanic Steam Navi-
gation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of
noncitizens]").
28 The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding that noncitizens in-
side U.S. may invoke greater constitutional protection than those seeking
admission).
29 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1976) (holding that
distinctions between citizens and noncitizens merit constitutional scrutiny); Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973); Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
30 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the equal
protection clause applies to all individuals within the U.S., including noncitizens);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) ("[Noncitizens] like citizens pay
taxes and may be called into the armed forces. [They] may live within a state for
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state.")
(internal citation omitted).
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power doctrine within immigration and alienage law because of a
growing respect for the sanctity of certain individual rights.3'
B. The State/Federal Dichotomy in Equal Protection Law
Regarding Alienage Classifications
The limited recognition of immigrants' rights described in the
previous section is clearly illustrated by the Court's equal protec-
tion jurisprudence regarding alienage classifications. This sub-
part will outline the Court's approach to the equal protection
rights of noncitizens with respect to both state and federal alien-
age classifications.
1. State Alienage Classifications
The guarantee of equal protection of the laws is found most
prominently in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Nor
shall any State ... deny to any person ... the equal protection
of the laws."32 As plainly stated in its text, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that individual states ensure that all per-
sons are treated equally under the law. Initially adopted as an
anti-racial discrimination measure, the Equal Protection Clause's
shining, and perhaps most famous, moment came with the high
Court's school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation." 'The doctrine of equal protection has also been used to
challenge unconstitutional government classifications on the ba-
sis of gender, 34 illegitimacy,35 and mental retardation.
36
The Court first extended equal protection to noncitizens in
31 In addition, the Court's decision to hold individual constitutional rights
supreme over governmental powers is consistent with the idea of a limited federal
government-a concept that the Court has strongly endorsed in the past. See, e.g.,
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1956) (describing the federal government to be "en-
tirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source.
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.")
(footnotes omitted).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring the doctrine of "separate but equal" violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause).
34 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives"). But see United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) ("Parties who seek to defend gender-based government ac-
tion must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action.") (in-
ternal citation omitted).
35 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
36 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins . 7 Specifically, the Court held unconstitu-
tional as applied a municipal building ordinance enforced exclu-
sively against Chinese nationals on the ground that such
enforcement deprived the petitioners of the equal protection of
the laws.38 It stated that the term "persons" in the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause included noncitizens as
well as United States citizens.39 Almost a century later, in Gra-
ham v. Richardson,4 the Court struck down a state statute de-
priving noncitizens of welfare benefits, stating that
"classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scru-
tiny."'" In the span of time between Yick Wo and Graham, the
Court expanded the equal protection rights of individual nonci-
tizens against the states by acknowledging immigrants' enjoy-
ment of this freedom and by holding that any state-sanctioned
discrimination would subject the offending law to severe judicial
scrutiny. Thus, the development of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection jurisprudence generally favored the indi-
vidual noncitizen over the state government.
In the area of state employment, however, the Court has rec-
ognized a narrow exception to this strict scrutiny rule. Under the
so-called "political function" doctrine, a state may exclude nonci-
tizens from occupying certain state government jobs to the extent
that such positions "go to the heart of representative govern-
ment."42 Thus, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, the Court sustained a
California requirement that all "peace officers" be citizens;
therefore, the permanent resident petitioners could be properly
excluded from service.43 Two years later, in Bernal v. Fainter,
Justice Marshall explained that:
The focus of our inquiry has been whether a position was such
37 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
38 Id. at 373.
39 Id. at 368-69.
40 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
41 Id. at 372.
42 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). See also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982) (sustaining California requirement that all "peace officers" be
citizens); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (holding that state may refuse to
employ as primary and secondary school teachers noncitizens who are eligible for
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (holding that New York could bar employment of noncitizens as state
troopers).
43 Cabell, 454 U.S. at 447.
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that the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discre-
tionary power over the formulation or execution of public pol-
icies importantly affecting the citizen population-power of
the sort that a self-governing community could properly en-
trust only to full-fledged members of that community.44
Nonetheless, outside the area of state government jobs of
political significance, all state alienage classifications are strictly
scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Federal Alienage Classifications
Federal alienage classifications, however, do not receive the
careful examination given state laws. The Court, invoking the
plenary power doctrine, has consistently deferred to the desires
of Congress at the expense of immigrants' rights. 5 Indeed, as
long as Congress acts solely within immigration law, affecting
only the entry and deportation of noncitizens, its plenary power
ensures that there will be no judicial review of Congressional
alienage classifications on equal protection grounds.46 This result
has some appeal: a sovereignty charged with naturalization pow-
ers must make distinctions between citizens and noncitizens in
order to create a coherent immigration policy, and, to this end,
Congress must establish alienage classifications in immigration
law. As Professor Peter Schuck has concluded, citizens and
noncitizens are therefore not similarly situated under immigra-
tion law, so noncitizens cannot claim the same status as citizens
under immigration law.
47
Noncitizens fare only slightly better when Congress creates
alienage classifications in non-immigration law contexts. Equal
protection jurisprudence reflects that the Court favors Congres-
sional plenary power over the equal protection rights of nonci-
tizens for at least two major reasons, one textual and one
contextual. Textually, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, unlike that of the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not specifically contain an equal protection component to curb
the federal government's action against noncitizens. 48 As will be
44 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1984).
45 See supra text accompanying notes 18-31.
46 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 564-66; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 10 (1990) ("Im-
migration policy, conceived of as membership rules, is thought to lie at the core of
national self-determination and self-definition.").
47 Schuck, supra note 7, at 24.
48 The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall ... be deprived of life,
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explained in Part II, this textual hurdle is arguably not problem-
atic after the Court's opinion in Adarand.4 9
However, the contextual justification is more deeply en-
trenched and has yet to be denounced by the Court. Because
Congress has long been regarded as having plenary power over
immigration and foreign relations, and the individual states have
not, the Court has been willing to grant more deference to Con-
gressional enactments within alienage law when challenged on
equal protection grounds. In Mathews v. Diaz,1° the Court up-
held a federal alienage classification leading to the denial of
Medicare benefits to some noncitizens. Despite its earlier state-
ment in Graham that alienage classifications, like those based on
race, were inherently suspect,51 the Court played the plenary
power card and pointed to Congress's inherent power over immi-
gration and foreign relations as necessitating judicial deference.52
Instead of reviewing the legislation through the lens of strict
scrutiny, the Court in Mathews upheld the federal alienage classi-
fication because it reasonably furthered a legitimate governmen-
tal interest-one which the judiciary felt it lacked the expertise
to review.53 As the Court concluded:
In this case, since appellees have not identified a principled
basis for prescribing a different standard than the one selected
by Congress, they have, in effect, merely invited us to substi-
tute our judgment for that of Congress in deciding which
liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend V. Indeed,
the Court reiterated this textual difference in its Adarand decision, stating that
"[a]lthough this Court has always understood [the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment] to provide some measure of protection against arbitrary treatment by
the Federal Government, it is not as explicit a guarantee of equal treatment as the
Fourteenth Amendment ..... Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,
213 (1995).
49 See infra Part II.
50 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976).
51 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
52 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85. "The equal protection analysis ... involves signifi-
cantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between [nonci-
tizens] and the States rather than between [noncitizens] and the Federal
Government."
53 In finding that the classification furthered a legitimate governmental interest,
the Court stated:
it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's eligibility
depend on both the character and duration of his residence. Since neither
requirement is wholly irrational, this case essentially involves nothing more
than a claim that it would have been more reasonable for Congress to se-
lect somewhat different requirements of the same kind.
Id. at 82-83.
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[noncitizens] shall be eligible to participate in the supplemen-
tary insurance program on the same conditions as citizens. We
decline the invitation.54
In sum, the Court's current equal protection stance varies little
from its overall constitutional view of the proper balance be-
tween immigrants' rights and the sovereign power of the
Congress.
Within immigration law, Congress is free to create alienage
distinctions as part of its plenary power. Within alienage law,
however, Congress's power weakens while noncitizens' equal
protection rights strengthen somewhat; Congress must provide a
rational basis for its decision to treat noncitizens differently from
citizens. Still, this deference to the plenary power doctrine de-
nies noncitizens the greater protection they receive against state
alienage classifications.
Whether in the context of immigration or alienage law, the
Court is reluctant to interfere with what it has perceived, and
continues to perceive, as the near-exclusive control of Congress
over the regulation of immigrants and foreign relations. On the
other hand, except in reviewing state jobs falling under the polit-
ical function doctrine, the Court casts a stern eye on any similar
legislation by the states on the ground that the states do not en-
joy Congress's plenary power over noncitizens. The end result of
this constitutional dichotomy is the threat of unbridled federal
power visited upon noncitizens protected only by the thin sheath
of deferential judicial review. Figure 1 below summarizes the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence with respect to
federal and state alienage classifications.
Entity/Scrutiny Strict Scrutiny Rational Basis Scrutiny
FEDERAL Alienage Immigration Law and
Classifications Alienage Law
STATE Alienage Alienage Law Political Function Cases
Classifications
FIGURE 1: THE CURRENT MODEL OF EQUAL PROTECTION FOR
ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS
The next Part contends that the Court's recent decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peia55 provides a precedential ba-
sis for overcoming the plenary power presumption when review-
54 Id. at 84.
55 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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ing equal protection challenges to Congressional alienage
classifications. Moreover, a historical review of the plenary
power doctrine demonstrates that continuing anti-immigrant sen-
timent mandates that strict scrutiny be the morally appropriate
standard of review.
II
THE POST-A DARAND ALTERNATIVE: STRICT
SCRUTINY FOR CONGRESSIONAL ALIENAGE
CLASSIFICATIONS
In Adarand, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether strict scrutiny should apply to a federal statute that clas-
sifies on the basis of race where a member of a minority group is
benefitted by the statute. While this case dealt primarily with
racial classifications, the majority's congruence principle pro-
vides the theoretical and precedential basis for storming the cita-
del of plenary power and finally applying strict scrutiny to
Congressional classifications, whether within immigration or
alienage law.
A. The Adarand Decision
At issue in Adarand was a federal statute that created financial
incentives for government contractors to subcontract work to
statutorily-defined "disadvantaged business enterprises"
("DBE's"). To qualify, a business had to show it suffered eco-
nomic and social disadvantage; the statute presumed that mem-
bers of minority groups were disadvantaged economically and
socially.56
In Adarand, Mountain Gravel won a highway construction
contract from the Federal Department of Transportation; Moun-
tain Gravel then solicited bids from several subcontractors, in-
cluding plaintiff Adarand Constructors, Inc. Adarand was the
lowest bidder but was not considered statutorily disadvantaged.
Therefore, Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonza-
les Construction Company, a DBE, and Mountain Gravel availed
itself of the incentive program. Had the program not existed,
Mountain Gravel would have awarded the subcontract to
Adarand. Adarand sued in federal court, charging that the stat-
ute's presumption that minorities qualified under the program
56 Id. at 206.
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was racially discriminatory and violated the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. The district court granted
the government's summary judgment motion; the Tenth Circuit
affirmed on the ground that the government had satisified the
heightened scrutiny standard of review.
In a five-to-four decision, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, remanded the case to the district court because strict
scrutiny, and not intermediate scrutiny, was the proper standard
of review for congressional racial classifications. This ruling is
noteworthy in at least two respects. First, Adarand explicitly
overturned the Court's 1990 ruling in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,5 7 to the extent that Metro chose to employ an intermediate
scrutiny standard to race-based classifications that were "be-
nign," such as affirmative action programs.58 The Court rea-
soned that Metro conflicted with a long line of precedent that
established strict scrutiny as the proper level of judicial review.5 9
Second, and more importantly, the Court reinstated an earlier
position that federal race-based classification schemes were sub-
ject to the same scrutiny as state racial classifications; 60 specifi-
57 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
58 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. Curiously, the Court never explained how to deter-
mine whether a law is "benign." See id. at 227.
59 Id. at 227. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (upholding
state quota for using minority businesses in contracting against a strict scrutiny stan-
dard); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-4 (1986) (applying strict
scrutiny to state layoff procedure); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980)
(reaffirming strict scrutiny as the standard of review for state race-based classifica-
tions; Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stating that
strict scrutiny should be applied in all cases involving racial classifications).
60 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975) ("[t]his Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims
has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment"); see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16
(1987) ("the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is
coextensive with that of the Fourteenth"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)
("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment."). Earlier in its opinion, the Court set forth the differ-
ence between the language from which equal protection is derived in the Fifth
Amendment versus the Fourteenth:
Adarand's claim arises under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
which provides that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Although this Court has always un-
derstood that Clause to provide some measure of protection against arbi-
trary treatment by the Federal Government, it is not as explicit a guarantee
of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
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cally, the Court held:
[A]II racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.
6 1
Citing a long line of precedent, the Court reaffirmed its earlier
decisions holding that equal protection claims under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment are treated the same as
those brought under the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court saw
no reason why the federal government should be subject to a
lesser constitutional duty than state governments when it enacts
racially discriminatory laws.62 While acknowledging a few excep-
tions where the judiciary properly defers to the political branches
of government, 63 the Court noted that these uncommon situa-
tions did not detract from the general principle of subjecting laws
to a single standard of scrutiny.'
Justice O'Connor cited three principles underlying the major-
ity's view of governmental racial classifications: "skepticism,"
"consistency," and "congruence." 65 "Skepticism" requires that
the courts critically examine all racial classifications with the
keenest eye because "[d]istinctions between citizens solely be-
cause of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people."66 "Consistency" demands that "the standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause [not be] dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classifica-
fion."67 "Congruence" mandates that "[e]qual protection analy-
sis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 68
With that, the Court concluded that strict scrutiny should apply
to all racial classifications, regardless of whether Congress or the
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213.
61 Id. at 227.
62 Id. at 213-18. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In view of
[the] decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.").63 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100,
101-102 n.21 (1976) (discussing Congress's plenary power over immigration)).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 223-4.
66 Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
67 Id. at 224 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 494 (1989)).
68 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93)).
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states established them and regardless of whether the targeted
race is benefited or burdened by the classification. The Court
was quick to caution, however, that strict scrutiny is not "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact."69 The Court added, "when race-based
action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailor-
ing' test this Court has set out in previous cases."7 ° As an exam-
ple of a valid program, the Court cited to its decision in United
States v. Paradise," in which all the Justices agreed that the per-
vasive racial discrimination within the Alabama Department of
Public Safety mandated the narrowly-tailored solution adopted
by the state government.72
The next subpart examines how Adarand's congruence princi-
ple can be used to argue that the federal courts should primarily
review Congressional alienage classifications, in the context of
both immigration and alienage law, through the lens of strict
scrutiny, just as they examine state laws that discriminate against
noncitizens. This subpart shall present the textual and contextual
reasons why strict scrutiny should be the single standard for re-
view of most alienage classifications.
B. An Alternate Model: Applying Adarand's Congruence
Principle to Federal and State Alienage Classifications
Adarand's congruence principle provides the starting point for
formulating an alternative to the Court's current equal protec-
tion approach to state and federal alienage classifications within
both immigration and alienage law. This proposed model ap-
pears below in Figure 2.
69 Id. at 235 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519).
70 Id.
71 480 U.S. at 167.
72 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)). Note,
however, that Richard D. Kahlenberg questions whether Paradise gives liberals
much hope because the facts of the case clearly involved conscious, as opposed to
unconscious, racism. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Entity/Scrutiny Strict Scrutiny Rational Basis Scrutiny
FEDERAL Alienage Alienage Law or Immigration Law and
Classifications Immigration Law Alienage Law
Involving Fundamental
Right
STATE Alienage Alienage Law Political Function Cases
Classifications
FIGURE 2: THE ALTERNATE MODEL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS
1. Within Alienage or Immigration Law Involving
Fundamental Right
Federal courts should apply the Court's current strict scrutiny
of state alienage classifications to federal alienage classifications
that affect immigrants' rights in the context of alienage law as
well as those that affect fundamental rights in the context of im-
migration law. Aside from fairly ensuring that items such as tax
burdens and welfare benefits are properly allocated between citi-
zen and noncitizen whether imposed by the state or federal au-
thorities, this congruence between alienage laws and immigration
laws that affect fundamental rights adequately captures the es-
sence of equal protection-the protection of discrete and insular
minorities.73
First, as a starting point, the text of the Adarand opinion sup-
ports the idea that federal alienage classifications should be
viewed with the same strict scrutiny to which state alienage laws
are subject. Despite the Adarand majority's insistence that the
congruence principle does not apply to laws within the expertise
of the political branches of government, such as immigration,74
alienage law-the law involving immigrants' rights-bears little
constitutional relation for equal protection purposes to immigra-
tion law-the law governing noncitizens' entry into and exit from
this country. Thus, under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
Congress may appropriately distinguish between citizens and
noncitizens in determining who is entitled to enter and leave the
United States as part of its immigration power. However, one's
citizenship may be of significantly less constitutional importance
when Congress distributes public benefits.75 Indeed, whether it
73 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
74 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218 (citing Hampton, 426 U.S. at 101-2).
75 This is especially true in a country such as the United States, where studies
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is a state or a federal entity that decides to deny a noncitizen
public benefits based on that person's status matters very little to
the individual affected by the denial.76
In alienage law, a classification distinguishing between citizen
and noncitizen onerously burdens the noncitizen, whether it is
the state or the federal government that chooses to create it.
Professor Kenneth Karst reminds us that it was not long ago that
Congress pursued several well-meaning, but ultimately coercive,
anti-immigrant measures within alienage law:
In 1918 Congress doubled the income tax on "non-resident
aliens"; although it was not clear who would be considered
non-resident, thousands of [noncitizens] promptly declared
their intention to become citizens. Other measures were pro-
posed and even introduced in Congress, but failed to pass:...
"suppression of the foreign-language press, mass internments,
and the denial of industrial employment to [noncitizens]. ' 77
Last year's welfare reform bill that denies certain benefits even
to documented immigrants closely mirrors the anti-immigrant
measures of old.78
In addition, even within immigration law, strict scrutiny should
be brought to bear on classifications that impair fundamental
rights. Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff suggests, for example,
that critical examination should follow the enactment of immi-
gration laws that burden family relationships; he provides the fol-
lowing example regarding the right to marry:
Citizens and permanent [residents] do not enjoy similar op-
portunities for reuniting with immediate family members lo-
show that, as a group, noncitizens contribute more than they take by way of public
assistance. Dave McCurdy, The Future of U.S. Immigration Law, 20 J. LEGis. 3, 7
(1994). Indeed, contrary to popular belief, a recent study by the Public Policy Insti-
tute of California revealed that few undocumented immigrants are lured to the U.S.
by government aid programs. Specifically, "as many as half of all Mexican immi-
grants return home within two years," disqualifying them from many social services
programs. Patrick J. McDonnell, Immigrants Not Lured By Aid, Study Says, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A3.
76 One criticism of this argument is that Justice O'Connor's congruence principle
could not possibly apply to the immigration law context because Congress has ple-
nary power over immigration and states do not; because these governmental entities
have incongruous powers, equal protection guarantees should not restrain the states
in the same way it does Congress. However, my proposed model resolves this ap-
parent conflict by subjecting Congress's immigration legislation to more deferential
treatment in the same way the Court has scrutinized "political function exception"
cases involving state alienage law. See infra part II.B.2.
77 Karst, supra note 2, at 314 (internal citations omitted).
78 See infra note 121.
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cated outside the United States. The entry of the spouse or
minor child of a [permanent resident] is subject to a numerical
limitation (if the relationship was formed after the [noncitizen]
entered the country), while the entry of the spouse or minor
child of a U.S. citizen is not. The impact of the statutory
scheme is dramatic because the numerical limits have created
a waiting list of tens of thousands of [noncitizens]. Thus, if a
permanent [resident] marries a Mexican national, the [nonci-
tizen] spouse may have to wait as long as 10 years to be eligi-
ble for entry. However, if a U.S. citizen marries a Mexican
national,, the [noncitizen] spouse may enter as soon as immi-
gration authorities process the paper work.7 9
Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with the "funda-
mental rights" strand80 of equal protection analysis which, in Pro-
fessor Aleinikoff's example invoking the constitutionally-based
fundamental right to marry,8l would sadly be subordinated to the
plenary power of Congress over immigration matters.
Second, as a practical matter, stricter scrutiny should apply to
79 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 870 (1989); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1996) (listing immigration
preferences for family members of citizens and permanent residents). See also Ger-
ald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration
Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 702 (1981):
Our constitution allows a state to favor, to some degree, its own residents
in the sharing, dividing and distribution of public resources within the
state.... If a national community can accommodate less than perfect shar-
ing among national citizens, should it not recognize in proper cases that
some things must be shared with non-citizens? Or even that some things
should be shared first with some non-citizens even to the exclusion of
citizens?
Indeed, Professor L6pez describes America's obligation to undocumented Mexi-
can workers as a moral one arising out of the United States and Mexico's long-
standing relationship that grows out of, but extends well beyond, their shared border
and the history of abuse visited upon undocumented Mexican workers by U.S. em-
ployers. Id. at 695-707.
8 0 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
490 (5th ed. 1992) (describing the "fundamental rights and interests" strand of equal
protection jurisprudence). The Supreme Court has noted that the Equal Protection
Clause does not create substantive constitutional rights; rather, a right is fundamen-
tal, and therefore afforded equal protection, if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
33-34 (1973). A specific enumeration of all the fundamental rights that are afforded
citizens is beyond this Article's scope. However, I recognize, sadly, that the
Supreme Court has yet to afford some citizens certain fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying homosexuals a right to privacy
currently afforded heterosexuals).
81 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin law that
required any state resident supporting minor children not in resident's custody to
first seek court approval before marrying).
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federal alienage classifications because the current rational basis
test has not had much force when pitted against the ancient ple-
nary power doctrine.82 Although it has been invoked recently to
strike a Colorado constitutional amendment that was patently
anti-homosexual,83 the existing rational basis test rarely has
bite8' to it, much less in its application to federal alienage classifi-
cations. In contrast, strict scrutiny will ensure parity in how laws
are reviewed.85 To do otherwise would be to effectively hold that
the plenary power of the federal government trumps the rights of
all noncitizens. In addition, to characterize the burdens on
noncitizens as merely incidental denies the reality that the harm
to the noncitizen is the same whether directly or indirectly in-
flicted.86 Indeed, the government should be more vigilant when
burdens are incidental so that it may properly assess the impact
of such burdens on noncitizens' lives.
Third, the dangerous intersection of race and alienage caution
greater, rather than lesser, scrutiny of both federal and state
alienage classifications. Professors Neil Gotanda and Robert
82 See infra Part I.A. Indeed, in some contexts outside alienage classifications, the
rational basis test has been extremely deferential to the point of not even appearing
to constitute judicial review. For example, in United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, the Court stated that it "has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
83 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
84 Gerald Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1972) (argu-
ing that "new bite" could be given to rational basis test by viewing the mere rational-
ity standard as a means-focused and less deferential test).
85 1 hold the majority of the Adarand court to its word that strict scrutiny is not
fatal. In fact, applying strict scrutiny to federal alienage classifications may help
redefine the doctrine so that it does not become fatal in fact. In one sense, equating
strict scrutiny to fatal scrutiny blurs the distinction between equal protection and
substantive due process to the extent that the former constitutional guarantee does
not prohibit the government from creating classifications among peoples; rather,
equal protection simply requires that these classifications are constitutionally per-
missible. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). See also infra Part I.B.2.
86 Professor Michael Dorf warns:
From the perspective of a rightholder, the severity of a law's impact has no
necessary connection to whether the law directly or incidentally burdens
the right's exercise. Direct burdens can be trivial-for example, a one-
penny tax on newspapers that publish editorials critical of the govern-
ment-whereas conversely, incidental burdens can be extremely harsh-
for example, applying a prohibition against wearing headgear in the mili-
tary to an Orthodox Jew.
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1177 (1996).
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Chang have written extensively about how Asian-Americans, un-
like blacks or whites, have always been marked as "foreign."
Professor Gotanda points to the Court's decision to uphold the
wartime internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry in United
States v. Korematsu as an example of this presumption at work:
The evacuated Japanese-Americans, including U.S. citizens,
were presumed to be sufficiently foreign for an inference by
the military that such racial-foreigners must be disloyal. Japa-
nese-Americans were therefore characterized as different
from the African-American racial minority. With the pres-
ence of racial foreignness, a presumption of disloyalty was rea-
sonable and natural.8 7
Gotanda's words strike a bitter chord in the real world: Racist
remarks directed against persons of Asian and Latino descent
more likely command the victims to return to their homeland
than slurs aimed at blacks. Indeed, immigrant blacks from the
West Indies often find a cultural disconnect with native African-
Americans and yet are often perceived as part of the indigenous
black community."
Affirming Gotanda's thesis, Chang points out the historical in-
tersection of race and immigration law in the Chinese Exclusion
Case, in which the Court affirmed Congress's ban on Chinese
immigration:
The Court begins by stating that the Chinese are foreigners of
a different race, or what Neil Gotanda terms, racialized for-
eigners.8 9 These racialized foreigners "will not assimilate with
us." Implicit in this is a notion of us or of we in "We the
People." The us the Court is talking about is the national
community. They, the Chinese, are not us. Further, they will
not assimilate with us. And therefore, we will not let them
become us. This is justified because they are dangerous to our
peace and security. They are the Yellow Peril, threatening our
87 Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087,
1098 (Hyung Chan Kim ed., 1982). See also Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in
American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1190-
92 (1985) (book review) (discussing Korematsu and other wartime "camp cases").
88 1 recall vividly that one college acquaintance, whose family was from Jamaica,
could not understand why members of the Black Cultural Club and the Gospel
Choir insisted that she join their organizations when she felt that she shared very
little of their culture.
89 Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion: The Magnuson Act of 1943,
the Act of July 2, 1946, the Presidential Proclamation of July 4, 1946, the Act of Au-
gust 9, 1946 and the Act of August 19, 1950, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309, 311-23 (Hyung-Chan Kim, ed. 1995).
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sense of the national community. Therefore, Congress must
exclude them at the border.
90
Chang concludes that Asian-Americans are "perpetual foreign-
ers" whose "[f]oreign-ness is inscribed upon our bodies in such a
way that Asian-Americans carry a figurative border with us. '"91
Latinos and Latinas, especially Mexican-Americans, also suffer
the stigma of living with figurative borders. Professor Kevin
Johnson notes that, despite public perception of the "illegal
alien" as the unskilled, brown-skinned, Mexican male, Mexicans
comprised only thirty-nine percent of all undocumented immi-
grants in the United States in 1992.92 While many more Mexi-
90 Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on Borders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW
NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 244, 247
(Juan Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter Chang, Meditation]. In his discussion of the Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, Professor Wani eloquently captures how the Court's belief in
national sovereignty provides a gloss of objectivity that masks the majority's under-
lying xenophobia, making the decision, at least in the Court's mind, more palatable
and legally justifiable:
There is also a sinister ideological purpose served by the fiction of sover-
eignty. The Court was undoubtedly caught up in the nativist xenophobia of
the era. It laments the desecration of the nation's homogeneity, progress,
tranquility and civilization, and derisively refers to the Chinese as untrust-
worthy, immoral and uncivilized. This prejudice must have had some influ-
ence on the Court's judgment. The fiction of sovereignty masked the
Court's underlying bigotry by providing the decision with a seemingly ob-
jective disinfectant.
Wani, supra note 17, at 83.
91 Chang, Meditation, supra note 90, at 249. See also Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1255-58 (1993) (discussing the concept of
"nativistic racism" as racism visited upon Asian Americans and those others who are
viewed as foreign).
Professor Chang relates his own experience with the literal and figurative
"border":
I thought about the U.S. border guard who stopped me when I tried to
return after a brief visit to Canada. My valid Ohio driver's license was not
good enough to let me return to my country, even though the guard had
just let in a white man with only a driver's license. No passport was asked
of him, yet the guard demanded mine.
Chang, Meditation, supra note 90, at 246. I myself am guilty of using "foreignness"
as an inappropriate stereotype. When I first arrived in the U.S. from the Philip-
pines, I was very disappointed that my cousins who had grown up in New York and
were U.S. citizens did not speak Tagalog and did not appear to value things Filipino.
I realize now that I had labeled them "foreign," something I probably would not
have done had they been white.
92 Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: the Intersection of Immi-
gration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1545-46 (1995)
[hereinafter "Johnson, Public Benefits"]. However, the Justice Department's latest
statistics indicate that as of October 1996 Mexicans comprise more than half of the
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cans are legal immigrants to this country,93 Mexicans, like Asian-
Americans, are marked as perpetually foreign by the color of
their skin. Further, just as Asian-Americans have been histori-
cally excluded through judicial and legislative action, Mexican-
Americans have been similarly targeted by government action,
most notably in California.94
More importantly, this intersection of race and alienage is not
simply a theoretical construct, but is a genuine concern born of
the recent influx of nonwhite immigrants. Since the National Or-
igins quota system severely curtailing immigration from predomi-
nantly nonwhite nations95 was abolished in 1965,96 most recent
immigrants have been from Asia and Latin America. 97 Indeed,
the top five countries of birth for legal immigrants in 1990 were
Mexico, El Salvador, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Domini-
can Republic.98 Because of the larger numbers of nonwhite im-
migrants, the more Congress and the states create alienage
current undocumented immigrant population of approximately five million. Eric
Schmitt, Illegal Immigrants Rose to Five Million in '96, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1997, at
9.
93 Indeed, Mexico was the top country of origin for legal immigrants to the United
States in 1960 and in 1990. MICHAEL FIx & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND
IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 25 (1994).
94 Perhaps the most notorious of the anti-immigration laws passed in California
was 1994's Proposition 187, which restricts undocumented immigrants' access to var-
ious state benefits. See, e.g., Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California's Proposition
187-Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Con-
stitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577 (1996) (providing detailed legal analy-
sis of Proposition 187). Not surprisingly, racially-tinged appeals to patriotism
marked the campaign to pass the initiative. See, e.g., Richard K. Yamauchi, Illegal
Students Given Preferential Coverage, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at B16 (letter to
the editor) ("[T]he state of California is not a province of Mexico. The victory of
Proposition 187 will be proof that the state of California belongs to the United
States of America."); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular
Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Ir-
relevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995).
95 This system, established by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1924,
resulted in biased admissions of northern and western Europeans over nonwhite
immigrants from "third world" countries. Fix & PASSEL, supra note 88, at 10.
96 Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911 (1965).
97 Interestingly, Australia had a similar ban on nonwhite immigration which it
abandoned in 1973. See Vijay Joshi, Australian Lawmaker's Ethnic Attacks Find a
Following, OREGONIAN, May 9, 1997, at A8.
98 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE (1990).
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classifications, the greater the likelihood that nonwhite immi-
grants will be unduly burdened by such classifications.
These large numbers make anti-immigration and anti-immi-
grants' rights law an easy proxy for racism.99 Through the inter-
section of race and alienage, nativist sentiment reinforces racist
beliefs and vice-versa, making it exceedingly more difficult to dis-
cern whether newer alienage classifications merely mask underly-
ing racial prejudice.100 By invoking strict scrutiny, courts will be
able to better ferret out invidious racial discrimination or per-
haps even benign neglect.'' In addition, white and black nonci-
tizens will benefit from the stricter standard even if the border of
foreignness does not specifically bound them.0 2
99 Ironically, the federal government has been very solicitous of immigrant labor
when such labor has served America's economic needs. L6pez, supra note 79, at 656
(citing 1917 immigration act and waiver of taxes for Mexicans). Indeed, during these
periods of economic plenty, Mexicans were seen as less troublesome than other im-
migrant groups. Id. at 656-7.
100 As several commentators have noted, California's Proposition 187 found much
support among those who shared an anti-Latino bent. See supra note 94; Neuman,
supra note 4, at 1451; Johnson, Public Benefits, supra note 92, at 1544-46.
101 As Karen K. Narasaki, Executive Director of the National Asian Pacific
American Legal Consortium noted recently in a symposium on immigration law at
Georgetown University:
"My feeling has been that talking about immigrants is really sort of the last accepta-
ble way to talk about race without actually talking about race." Georgetown Immi-
gration Law Journal, 10th Anniversary Symposium-March 6, 1996 Transcript, 10
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 5, 27 (1996).
102 Indeed, white noncitizens are harmed just as much as nonwhite immigrants
with the passage of facially neutral, but latently racial, anti-immigration laws:
These factors are powerful in isolation, but even more so in combination.
Hostility toward a particular foreign group may result in discriminatory
legislation directed against aliens as a class, even if voters have a more
tolerant attitude toward other foreigners. For example, hostility toward
Latino immigration can provoke support for anti-alien legislation among
voters who have no objection to Canadians. Since Canadians are excluded
from the political process, they can easily be sacrificed to confer a facial
neutrality on the discriminatory measures.
Neuman, supra note 4, at 1429.
Of course, while white noncitizens may not experience the racism suffered by non-
whites, the former often endure plain, old-fashioned nativism, as demonstrated by
these remarks from a Russian immigrant:
No, I don't feel immigrants are persecuted ... But there is a sense we're
not welcome. It's more a sense I sometimes get when people look at me
when I pass them on the street. There's just a feeling of being unwelcome,
when people seem like they move away from you because you are from
Russia.
Charisse Jones, For New York's Newcomers, Anxiety Over Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1996, at Al. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court may not readily accept the
"alienage as race" argument because it has been reluctant to view proxies such as
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Fourth, noncitizens have relatively little political power be-
cause they do not have the power to vote. 10 3 While other minor-
ity groups-blacks, women, gays and lesbians-may argue
(whether correctly or incorrectly) that they have suffered more
historically, these groups have had the benefit of the franchise
and access to the political process,"°4 while noncitizens have had
to rely on the benevolence of citizen-advocacy groups. 10 5 Unfor-
tunately, such advocacy is hampered by the reality that Congress
largely has free rein to discriminate against noncitizens, even on
the basis of activity that is not illegal."° Further, where Congress
enacts laws that only incidentally burden immigrants' rights, the
judiciary should be particularly alert because noncitizens' advo-
cates may not act as swiftly as they would if the law directly
targets noncitizens, notwithstanding the genuine impact on the
affected group.
10 7
language or wealth discrimination as equivalent to race discrimination. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (language discrimination); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (wealth discrimination). Fortunately, as more fully
explained in this subpart, noncitizens need not rely solely on the proxy argument to
make their case for greater constitutional protection. See generally Part II.B.
103 Rosberg, supra note 12, at 304.
104 It was this access to the ballot box that caused Justice Scalia to characterize
Colorado's passage of its anti-homosexual legislation, Amendment 2, as simply
majoritarian politics at work. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional
amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a "bare ... desire to
harm" homosexuals .... but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly toler-
ant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.
105 According to Professor Kevin Johnson:
Immigrant and refugees rights groups lobby the legislatures and agencies
and advocate in the courts to protect noncitizens. These groups, with the
assistance of others, have enjoyed some success in convincing Congress to
enact laws, such as the Refugee Act of 1980, and at times to override
Supreme Court decisions.
Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1139,
1155.
106 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upheld deportation of former
Communist Party members even though they were no longer members when mem-
bership as grounds for deportation became law). The Court invoked the doctrine of
plenary power to support its decision: "[Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intri-
cately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government."
Id. at 588-89.
107 "When discriminatory provisions are enacted incidentally, as part of a program
not primarily concerned with aliens or immigration, Congress is less likely to be held
politically accountable by members of the electorate concerned with the treatment
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Fifth, the United States has long taken pride in promoting the
values of diversity, tolerance, and community. We experience di-
versity in the large influx of nonwhite immigrants into this coun-
try; it would be a shame if the salutary effects of the abolition of
the National Origins quota system of immigration' 08-itself a tri-
umph of the nation's commitment to diversity-continue to be
diminished by the passing of ever more oppressive anti-immi-
grant laws subject to minimal judicial scrutiny. Moreover, toler-
ance is not only the touchstone of the First Amendment free
speech right, 109 but also exemplifies the principle underlying the
Declaration of Independence. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "We
hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal."'1 0 A government that fails to appreciate the equal moral
worth of all people' "-citizen and noncitizen-fails to fully ad-
here to the historical imperative of tolerance of different people
with different views and backgrounds. Finally, the United States
has long believed in the principle of community. As stated in the
introduction to this Article, the very words inscribed on the
Statue of Liberty proclaim America as a welcoming community
for those rejected by other nations." 2 To allow federal and state
governments to divide the community of America between citi-
of noncitizens, and should be most hesitant to defer." Note, Developments in the
Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1421-22
(1983); Rosberg, supra note 12, at 325 ("[T]he government's legitimate interest in
[maintaining a flexible immigration policy] does not require immunity from careful
judicial scrutiny for every piece of federal legislation that has some bearing on aliens
or immigration.").
108 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (Powell, J.) (noting that the attainment of a di-
verse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal stemming from the univer-
sity's First Amendment-based interest in promoting academic freedom).
109 "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971):
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent
on a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an es-
sentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would ef-
fectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of
personal predilections.
110 John Isbister, Are Immigration Controls Ethical?, 23 SOCIAL JusTICE 54, 55
(1996) (citing the Declaration of Independence). Professor Isbister cites the Decla-
ration of Independence along with other American historical documents to support
his argument that a moral immigration policy should stem from the proposition that
all people, regardless of citizenship, are of equal moral worth. Id.
111 Id.
112 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
zen and noncitizen in the conferral of benefits without good rea-
son would be to undermine the historical principle of community
symbolized so eloquently by Lady Liberty.
In sum, the logic of the congruence principle, the inefficacy of
the rational basis test in safeguarding immigrants' rights, the dan-
gerous intersection between race and alienage, the political
powerlessness of noncitizens, and America's historical adherence
to principles of diversity, tolerance, and community combine to
create a powerful case for strictly scrutinizing federal alienage
classifications in the same manner as state classifications in the
realm of alienage law and fundamental rights.
That notwithstanding, subpart two recognizes the need for
some leeway on the part of a Congress charged with creating a
viable immigration policy and an executive branch charged with
enforcing the policy. Subpart two suggests that the congruence
principle can be fairly interpreted to allow for a narrower plenary
power doctrine analogous to the political function exception that
the courts use to review certain state alienage classifications.
Applying a rational basis test in such cases achieves a fair bal-
ance between deferring to important governmental power and
protecting equally important individual rights.
2. Within Immigration Law, but Not Involving Fundamental
Right
Invoking strict scrutiny to review federal alienage classifica-
tions would end years of judicial deference to congressional ple-
nary power and, if not properly utilized, could lead to a major
upheaval in the federal judicial system. Strictly reviewing con-
gressional acts could subject the thousands of laws pertaining to
noncitizens, as well as the entire Immigration and Naturalization
Act,'13 to "the most rigid scrutiny,""' 4 which many would assume
to mean "fatal scrutiny.""' 5 In addition, the prospect of so many
laws challenged under strict scrutiny could result in a needless
113 8 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1994).
114 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
115 At least one group of commentators doubts whether the Adarand majority's
assurances that strict scrutiny is not fatal are to be believed: "Given a critical mass
of juridical animus toward racial preferences, at least as the Court is presently con-
stituted, it is difficult to imagine much constitutional room for overt attention to
racial disadvantage in the real world. Heightening that impression is the actuality
that the program struck down in Adarand seemed more responsive than previously
upheld policies to demands for focus beyond exclusive attention to race and for
narrowly tailored initiatives that avoid conferring windfall benefits upon nondis-
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waste of judicial resources. Finally, close review of congressional
action over immigration may strike some as violating the separa-
tion of powers doctrine or as an impermissible review of essen-
tially political questions.
However, this parade of horribles need not ensue if Adarand's
congruence principle is followed. Just as the political function
exception allows states substantial leeway in creating alienage
classifications, 1 6 an analogous federal exception should also ap-
ply to reviewing congressional alienage classifications that genu-
inely affect our national sovereignty. Because the Constitution
requires Congress to determine who may join this political
union,17 the federal courts should appropriately defer to Con-
gress in this area. Deferential review of the many immigration
and naturalization laws would ensure that the Immigration and
Naturalization Act survives intact and that the already busy fed-
eral courts are not further burdened. In addition, this will ulti-
mately defeat the spurious notion that judicial review of every
immigration decision necessarily influences American foreign
policy.
118
advantaged individuals." DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES 631-32 (1996).
116 Professor Michael Scaperlanda views the state political function cases as pro-
viding "a model, albeit rather crude, for re-envisioning the tension between commu-
nal formation and the rights' claims of the noncitizen." Scaperlanda, supra note 8,
at 769. By creating an analogous construct in the area of federal alienage classifica-
tions, a similar balance between community and individual rights may be struck.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (describing textual origins of Con-
gress's immigration power).
118 As Professor Wani has noted:
Although immigration is generally considered a foreign affairs question, it
is unlikely that the review of one immigration dispute could either preju-
dice the country's relations with other nations or undermine the executive's
effectiveness as the nation's representative. Immigration decisions usually
involve only individual determinations that do not rise to the magnitude of
international incidents, especially because every country recognizes the au-
thority to regulate the admission of foreigners. Conversely, even if one
accepts the questionable proposition that the executive can use immigra-
tion decisions as a foreign policy tool, (for example, denying admission to
the citizens of a country to express disapproval or in an attempt to change
that country's policy), that decision should not be insulated from judicial
review to the extent that it impacts an individual's liberty interests.
The fiction of sovereignty is perpetuated precisely because it provides an
impregnable mask that allows the Court to escape the duty to provide rea-
sons for its decisions while, at the same time, appearing perfectly rational.
It satisfies the yearning for certainty, objectivity, continuity and consis-
tency, even as it is used to make value judgments about individual claims.
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Moreover, applying strict scrutiny to alienage laws and immi-
gration laws involving basic fundamental rights may lead to a sal-
utary redefinition of strict scrutiny so that such rigid review is not
tantamount to a fatal blow. In Adarand, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg were quick to point out that, historically, strict scrutiny
has almost always led to the inevitable invalidation of laws sub-
jected to its sharp gaze.' 19 However, courts should revive the im-
portant notion that equal protection doctrine, unlike substantive
due process doctrine, acknowledges that laws often create group
classifications; equal protection doctrine simply requires that
these classifications make constitutional sense. Justice Jackson
emphasized this distinction when he wrote:
Invocation of the equal protection clause[, unlike the due pro-
cess clause,] does not disable any governmental body from
dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the pro-
hibition or regulation must have a broader impact. I regard it
as a salutary doctrine that [governments] must exercise their
powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants ex-
cept upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract jus-
tice.... [T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a mi-
nority must be imposed generally.1
2 °
Thus, following Adarand's congruence principle, the strict scru-
tiny standard currently applied to state alienage classifications
should also apply to federal alienage classifications, tempered by
analogous political function exceptions in recognition of the gov-
ernment's role in shaping the political community.
CONCLUSION
Over the past few years, anti-immigration sentiment at the fed-
eral and state levels has run particularly high. Last year's pas-
sage of the federal welfare bill left the states scrambling,
Wani, supra note 17, at 81, 87-88. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
119 See Adarand v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.2 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[The strict scrutiny] label has usually been understood to spell the death of any
governmental action to which a court may apply it."); id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) ("[The majority's] opinion strongly suggests that the strict standard an-
nounced is indeed 'fatal' for classifications burdening groups that have suffered
discrimination in our society.").
120 Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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sometimes with arguably overzealous glee,12' to enforce the law's
provision denying certain benefits to documented, as well as un-
documented, immigrants. This current wave of anti-immigrant
action has well-founded historical roots grounded in the danger-
ous intersection between race and alienage.
To address this constant problem, the Adarand Court's "con-
gruence principle" provides an important cornerstone for the
creation of a new equal protection model of government alienage
classifications, one in which federal as well as state action will be
viewed under the same test. Underlying the congruence princi-
ple, however, is a more important concept that goes to the heart
of equal protection: the protection of perpetually disadvantaged
groups from invidious discrimination by the government. In the
case of alienage, special scrutiny is particularly important be-
cause a readily identifiable group of people, composed mostly of
people of color, is deprived of the franchise and hence the oppor-
tunity to influence the government through the democratic pro-
cess. This political powerlessness coupled with the added burden
of being foreign and often nonwhite make the noncitizen particu-
larly vulnerable to laws which may, consciously or unconsciously,
have been motivated by outmoded and invidious stereotypes.
122
121 California Governor Pete Wilson, a long-time proponent of immigration cur-
tailment and a staunch supporter of Proposition 187, has been very aggressive in his
determination to enforce the new provisions, some of which allow for states to deny
welfare benefits to certain public assistance recipients. Tim Golden, California Gov-
ernor Acts to End State Aid for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at Al.
Not surprisingly, noncitizen advocacy groups in immigrant-rich states like New York
and Texas have been very concerned about the direct effects the bill will have on
legal immigrants awaiting naturalization and the indirect effects the federal cuts will
have on local economies. See Jones, supra note 102, at Al; Sam Howe Verhovek,
Texas Immigrants Worry As Cuts in Welfare Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
Aside from California, New York, and Texas, an overwhelming number of immi-
grants entering in the 1980s live in only three other states: Florida, New Jersey, and
Illinois. Fix & PASSEL, supra note 93, at 29. While Congress recently amended the
1996 bill to restore some benefits to permanent resident immigrants who arrived
here before August 22, 1996, many noncitizens fall outside the exempt categories;
since September 1, 1997, the non-exempt immigrants have had to rely on state bene-
fits. See Rebecca Christie, Welfare Changes Hit State, THE BULLETIN, Aug. 29, 1997,
at B1. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5301, 111 Stat.
251 (1997) (extending noncitizen eligibility for social security benefits).
122 Professor John Hart Ely captured the essence of this "we-they" dichotomy in
equal protection analysis:
A decision to distinguish blacks from whites (or women from men) will
therefore have its roots in a comparison between a "we" stereotype and a
"they" stereotype. They [blacks or women] are generally inferior to or not
so well qualified as we [whites or men] are in the following respect(s),
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Yet the model recognizes that not all classifications are neces-
sarily motivated by nativistic racism. 123 Both Congress, which is
charged with the power to regulate immigration and naturaliza-
tion, and the states, which are allowed to define their own polit-
ical communities, must be given leeway in creating policies that
necessarily harm noncitizens. However, even in deferring to gov-
ernment power, such deference cannot be total or complete. The
government, be it federal or state, must articulate a constitution-
ally rational basis for the alienage classification before it may
proceed further.
Let us not forget that there are people in this nation who exist
on the fringe of society because of their noncitizenship and that,
as an immigrant nation committed to the proposition of "equality
under the law," we must steadfastly protect their rights lest they
continue to be pushed further and further away from society's
core. If we profess to believe in ideals such as tolerance, diver-
sity, and community, we must all be willing to safeguard those
principles vigilantly lest they fade into nothingness.124
which we find sufficient to justify the classification.... The danger is there-
fore greater in we-they situations that we will overestimate the validity of
the proposed stereotypical classification by seizing upon the positive myths
about our own class and the negative myths about theirs.
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1973).
123 See Chang, Meditation, supra note 90, at 245 ("nativism and racism intersect
as nativistic racism").
124 As Professor Karst has observed:
The ideological component of our civic culture is thus a major part of the
cultural cement that holds American society together. Ideology alone,
however, is not enough to make any value a durable part of the civic cul-
ture. A necessary ingredient of that durability is the behavior of large
numbers of people, from one generation to the next, in accordance with the
culture's norms. Leonard Levy has recently shown that the freedom of the
press emerged in America during the revolutionary generation, primarily
through the day-to-day exercise by newspaper editors of the freedom they
claimed, not through the adoption of the first amendment. So it is with any
important societal value or any constitutional right: use it or lose it.
Karst, supra note 2, at 368-69 (citing LEONARD LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PREss 288-89 (1985)).
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